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We consider a model of on-the-job search where firms offer long-term wage contracts to 
workers of different ability. Firms do not observe worker ability upon hiring but learn it 
gradually over time. With sufficiently strong information frictions, low-wage firms offer 
separating contracts and hire all types of workers in equilibrium, whereas high-wage firms 
offer pooling contracts designed to retain high-ability workers only. Low-ability workers have 
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1.1 Motivation and Summary
The ability of the labor market to allocate resources hinges upon the type and severity of the frictions
that prevent workers and ﬁrms in forming the most eﬃcient matches. On the one hand, theories of
search frictions emphasize the costs associated with ﬁnding the right worker or the right job. Theories of
adverse selection, on the other hand, stress the importance of asymmetric information as an impediment
for labor turnover.1 Taken together these frictions can present formidable barriers for eﬃcient resource
allocation and have profound eﬀects on the distribution of wages. Lockwood (1991), for example,
suggests that adverse selection exacerbates the negative eﬀects of search frictions by reducing the re-
employment chances of unemployed workers. With almost no exceptions, however, current contributions
on labor search with adverse selection abstract from job-to-job ﬂows,2 although these transitions account
for a sizable part of worker ﬂows. Furthermore, the rate at which workers change jobs is an important
determinant of wage dispersion among similar workers (see, e.g., Mortensen (2003) and Hornstein,
Krusell, and Violante (2010)). Thus one would expect that asymmetric information not only has
non-trivial implications for worker job-to-job turnover, but also for the distribution of wages and in
particular on dispersion that is attributed to market frictions.
In this paper we consider a frictional labor market where workers search on the job and ﬁrms post
wages. Firms commit to pay their posted wages for as long as the workers remain employed in the
ﬁrm. Upon hiring, ﬁrms cannot observe the ability of their applicants, but they learn the worker’s
ability with delay during the employment spell. Using this framework we study three questions. (i)
What characterizes job-to-job transitions in an environment of adverse selection and search frictions?
(ii) What is the resulting allocation of workers among ﬁrms? (iii) What is the impact on the wage
distribution? We argue that the combination of on-the-job search and adverse selection can have
profound eﬀects on the allocation of resources and on the distribution of wages, particularly when
information frictions are rather severe.
Our model is based on the equilibrium search model proposed by Burdett and Mortensen (1998). As
this model provides an elegant theory of worker turnover and wage dispersion under perfect information
about worker ability, it is the natural benchmark for our work. In deviation from this benchmark,
information is asymmetrically distributed in our model: while workers are perfectly informed about
their ability, ﬁrms learn workers’ ability slowly over time. Firms compete for workers by oﬀering long-
term contracts which specify a ﬂat wage, speciﬁc for a worker type and promised to be paid for the
duration of the employment relation.3 To separate workers, ﬁrms can commit to ﬁre workers who
1Search models of the labor market are surveyed in Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005). For labor market implications
of adverse selection, see e.g. Salop and Salop (1976), Greenwald (1986), Gibbons and Katz (1991).
2We review some of this literature in Section 1.2 below.
3We motivate our focus on ﬂat-wage contracts below.
2misreport their type upon hiring.
Firms follow one of two strategies in equilibrium. Either they decide to oﬀer separating contracts
or they oﬀer pooling contracts. Separating contracts provide all workers with the same retention rates,
while pooling contracts provide higher retention rates for more able workers. We show that the set of
equilibria can be parameterized by the degree of information frictions. When ﬁrms learn suﬃciently
fast the type of a worker, only separating contracts are oﬀered in equilibrium. Otherwise, equilibria are
segmented: low-wage ﬁrms oﬀer separating contracts, while high-wage ﬁrms oﬀer pooling contracts.
In any segmented equilibrium, low-ability workers have higher job-turnover rates. Precisely this
feature gives rise to positive sorting: High-wage and high-productivity ﬁrms end up employing a larger
share of high-ability workers. The explanation is that high-wage ﬁrms aim to compete more strongly
for high-ability workers and ﬁnd it too costly to provide the necessary information rents to low-ability
workers in a menu of separating contracts. Hence, they oﬀer pooling contracts which retain a larger
share of workers of higher ability. Although these ﬁrms also attract low-ability workers, these workers are
laid oﬀ after the employer learns their type. In contrast, ﬁrms with lower wages and lower productivity
prefer to separate workers and hence oﬀer stable wage contracts. These ﬁrms end up employing a larger
fraction of low-ability workers.
These turnover and sorting patterns have important consequences. They imply that the economy’s
total output is smaller when ﬁrms face search and (suﬃciently large) information frictions than, for ex-
ample, when ﬁrms face the same search frictions but are completely uninformed (or perfectly informed)
about worker ability. Indeed, both in the absence of information and under full information, random
search implies that all ﬁrms employ the same proportion of high- and low-ability workers, and all work-
ers have the same employment rates. With asymmetric information, however, low-ability workers are
more likely to get ﬁred which reduces aggregate output, even when all ﬁrms are equally productive.
But if ﬁrms diﬀer in productivity, the positive sorting pattern gives rise to an additional loss of output:
this is because low-ability workers are more likely to ﬁnd employment in low-productivity ﬁrms. As
a consequence, low-productivity ﬁrms are bigger and total output is further depressed relative to the
no-sorting benchmark.
The equilibrium sorting allocation that arises is consistent with recent empirical evidence showing
that labor markets are characterized by positive sorting among workers and ﬁrms, or among workers and
coworkers within ﬁrms (see Lopes de Melo (2009) and Bagger and Lentz (2008)). It is also consistent
with the empirical evidence that documents the ﬁrm-size/wage-premium relation that is widely observed
in many labor markets. Our model implies that high-wage ﬁrms are not only bigger, but they also
employ a more productive workforce. The workforce of a high-wage ﬁrm is more productive because
this ﬁrm is able to retain a larger proportion of high-ability workers. The model is therefore consistent
with evidence demonstrating the importance of ﬁrm and worker characteristics in accounting for the
positive relation between wages and ﬁrm size (see e.g. Brown and Medoﬀ (1989), Abowd, Kramarz,
3and Margolis (1999), Haltiwanger, Lane, and Spletzer (1999), Idson and Oi (1999)). The part left
unexplained by these characteristics in those studies is attributed in this paper, as in Mortensen (2003),
to labor market frictions.
The cross-sectional variation in wages implied by the model is determined by (i) dispersion in
worker ability, (ii) dispersion in ﬁrm productivity and (iii) frictional wage dispersion (workers of the
same ability are paid diﬀerently). As opposed to many previous studies that analyze wage dispersion
using equilibrium search models (see e.g. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and
Coles (2009), and Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2010)), here the frictional component of the wage
distribution combines the information frictions faced by employers and the search frictions faced by
both workers and ﬁrms. We show that when information frictions are suﬃciently strong, frictional
wage dispersion is higher for low-ability than for high-ability workers. We also show that the amount of
frictional wage dispersion faced by low-ability workers follows a hump-shaped relation with the ﬁrms’
learning rate. That is, wage dispersion is highest for intermediate informational asymmetries.
The associated wage dynamics and turnover patterns also diﬀer decisively between workers. Low-
ability workers change jobs and experience unemployment more often than high-ability workers. In
turn, the earnings of low-ability workers are characterized by more frequent upward and downward
mobility. This property implies that high job turnover is associated with lower average wages as found
in empirical studies (see, e.g., Mincer and Jovanovic (1981) and Light and McGarry (1998)). The main
diﬀerence here is that this relationship arises due to ﬁrms’ optimal wage policies in the presence of
adverse selection and search frictions rather than from lower levels of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital of
high-mobility workers (Farber (1999)).
Our restriction to constant-wage contracts is motivated by the wage-posting model described in
Burdett and Mortensen (1998). Under this speciﬁcation, we assume that ﬁrms commit not to counter
any outside oﬀer. We also rule out that ﬁrms oﬀer back-loading wage schedules. Stevens (2004) and
Burdett and Coles (2003) show that optimal wage-tenure contracts exhibit an increasing wage-tenure
proﬁle. By restricting attention to constant wages we are able to consider the implications of adverse
selection, on-the-job search and ﬁrm heterogeneity on wage dispersion, job turnover and the allocation of
resources in a simple and tractable environment.4 This restriction is also motivated by recent evidence
showing that there is very little or even no returns to ﬁrm-speciﬁc tenure, implying that in reality
ﬁrms oﬀer mostly ﬂat-wage contracts, conditional on labor market experience. Indeed, Kambourov and
Manovskii (2009) for the US and Williams (2009) for the UK show that returns to ﬁrm tenure greatly
diminishes or even disappears when controlling for experience in an industry and/or occupation. We
believe this modeling restriction is a good starting point to understand wage dispersion and labor
4For example, Stevens (2004) shows that the dispersion in contract oﬀers and job-to-job turnover disappears when con-
sidering wage-tenure contracts and risk-neutral workers. Burdett and Coles (2003) show that one can regain these features
when workers are risk averse, but a model with risk-averse workers and ﬁrm heterogeneity becomes highly intractable (see
Burdett and Coles (2010)).
4turnover in an environment with search frictions and adverse selection which generates predictions
consistent with the empirical evidence on sorting patterns, the ﬁrm-size/wage premium relation and
job turnover.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After a brief review of related literature, we set out the
basic framework in Section 2. We focus ﬁrst on the case where all ﬁrms are homogeneous which helps
to derive a full equilibrium characterization in the most transparent way. In Section 3 we characterize
equilibria with limited information. Particularly, we show that all ﬁrms separate their applicants when
the ﬁrms’ learning rate is high enough; but when information frictions are suﬃciently severe, a fraction
of high-wage ﬁrms oﬀer pooling contracts and end up employing more high-ability workers. Implications
for the ﬁrm-size/wage relation, for individual wage dynamics and wage dispersion are illustrated using
numerical examples in Section 4. Section 5 introduces ﬁrm heterogeneity, it extends the key theoretical
results for this setting and studies the sorting implications. Section 6 discusses the robustness of the
main results. Section 7 concludes. All proof and tedious derivations are relegated to the Appendix.
1.2 Related Literature
Besides a few earlier contributions (Lockwood (1991), Albrecht and Vroman (1992), Montgomery
(1999)), a number of recent papers study the interrelation between search frictions and adverse se-
lection. Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010) analyze existence and eﬃciency properties of competitive
search models with adverse selection, characterizing separating equilibria where diﬀerent worker types
are employed in diﬀerent contracts. As they consider a static environment, they cannot discuss worker
turnover or wage dynamics. Inderst (2005) analyzes existence of separating equilibria in a model of
random search with adverse selection. In his model the composition of the pool of searching individuals
evolves over time. However, once a productive match is formed and a contract agreed, the pair leaves the
market. To the best of our knowledge, there are only two papers with on-the-job search under adverse
selection. Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) analyze the eﬀects of ﬁring cost on diﬀerent types of workers
in a model with search on-the-job, assuming however an ad-hoc wage schedule. This is very diﬀerent
from this paper which is interested in optimal wage policies under adverse selection. Visschers (2007)
considers a model with random search based on Stevens (2004) and assumes that both the worker and
his employer do not observe the worker’s (match-speciﬁc) ability at the start of the relation. Although
the employer learns faster than the worker, it oﬀers the same wage contract to all its new hires.
A few papers consider the interaction of search frictions and adverse selection to study ﬁrms’ deci-
sions to oﬀer a take-it-or-leave-it wage oﬀer or to engage in bilateral bargaining with their job appli-
cants. Camera and Delacroix (2004), for example, consider a random search model, while Michelacci
and Suarez (2006) consider a directed search model to address this issue. As in our paper, ﬁrms choose
between diﬀerent types of contracts which impacts the type of workers they employ. Michelacci and
Suarez (2006) shows that when ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between the two, the market segments and ﬁrms
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tivity workers.5 In our paper we restrict attention to wage posting and let ﬁrms choose between oﬀering
separating contracts to hire both types of workers at diﬀerent wages or posting a pooling contract that
provides a higher retention rate for high-ability workers.
This paper also relates to the literature that analyze resource allocation in markets with search
frictions. In particular, Lentz (2010) constructs a model based on the framework developed by Postel-
Vinay and Robin (2002) in which workers of diﬀerent abilities have diﬀerent search intensities. He
shows that in equilibrium more able workers search harder and hence have a higher chance of being
employed in more productive ﬁrms when the production function is supermodular. We also assume a
supermodular production function, but keep the search technology as simple as possible to stress the
role adverse selection has on ﬁrms’ wage policies and generating positive sorting. Both papers share
an important feature: ﬁrms operate under constant returns to scale and have no capacity constraints
in hiring workers. This implies that in both cases the sorting process is driven by workers’ ability to
search on the job. This is in contrast to partnership models of sorting where both sides of the market
are constrained in match formation (e.g. Shimer and Smith (2000)).
Finally, this work contributes to the emerging literature that analyzes the joint implications of
search frictions and workers’ productivity diﬀerences on wage dispersion and wage dynamics. Although
most of this literature allows for human capital accumulation (see Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles
(2009), Bagger, Fontaine, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2009), Fu (2010)), it also assumes that, upon a
meeting, a ﬁrm is able to perfectly observe the productivity of its applicants. In our paper, workers
do not accumulate human capital while employed, but ﬁrms learn the productivity of their applicants
on-the-job. Asymmetric information thus generates a new source of frictional wage dispersion that has
not been explored when analyzing the fundamental contributions to wage inequality.
2 Basic Framework
Consider a continuous time economy that is in steady state. There is a unit mass of risk neutral workers
and ﬁrms. The life of any worker has uncertain duration and follows an exponential distribution with
parameter φ > 0. To keep the population of workers constant, φ also describes the rate at which new
workers enter the labor market. Firms are inﬁnitely lived. All agents have a zero rate of time preference.
Hence, the objective of any worker is to maximize total expected lifetime utility, and the objective of
any ﬁrm is to maximize expected the steady-state proﬁt ﬂow.
There are two types of workers who diﬀer in their innate ability. A fraction αH has high ability
εH and a fraction αL = 1 − αH has low ability εL. Firms operate under a constant returns to scale
technology and, for the main part of this paper, they all have the same productivity p. We consider
5Interestingly, there is no segmentation in the random search model proposed by Camera and Delacroix (2004).
6the implications of ﬁrm heterogeneity in Section 5. An employed worker with ability εi generates ﬂow
output εip for i = L,H.
Once a ﬁrm and a worker meet, the productivity of the ﬁrm is common knowledge. The ability
of the worker, however, remains the worker’s private information. We assume that ﬁrms monitor the
output of a particular worker at rate ρ. This parameter describes the ﬁrm’s learning rate.6 Further, we
assume that the monitoring technology is such that once the ﬁrm has learned the worker’s ability, the
latter can be veriﬁed in a court of law. In other respects the information structure mirrors that of the
Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model. In particular, ﬁrms do not observe an applicant’s employment
status or any other aspect of the worker’s employment history. In Section 6 we explore the implications
of this assumption.
Unemployed and employed workers meet ﬁrms according to a Poisson process with parameter λ > 0.
Once a meeting takes place, the ﬁrm oﬀers a menu of contracts to the worker. A contract consists of
two elements: (i) a wage and (ii) a ﬁring policy. We assume that a ﬁrm can fully commit to both
parts of the contract. More speciﬁcally, a ﬁrm oﬀers the wage wi to workers of ability i = L,H. If
a worker truthfully reports his type upon hiring, the ﬁrm commits not to ﬁre the worker and to pay
wi for the rest of the employment relation. If a worker misreported his type, he is paid wi until the
ﬁrms learns his true type. At that point, the ﬁrm issues the punishment and ﬁres the worker. As we
restrict the analysis to constant-wage contracts and rule out any further transfers between workers and
ﬁrms, a layoﬀ is the only possible form of punishment to a deviating worker. In Section 6 we explore
the implications of relaxing our constant wage assumption, allowing the ﬁrm to cut the wage of the
misreporting worker. We also discuss the assumption of commitment to the ﬁring policy.
In the following, we identify contracts by the wage paid to a worker who reports type i. Let Fi(wi)
denote the proportion of ﬁrms oﬀering a wage no greater than wi to workers of type i, for i = L,H.
Further, let wi and wi denote the inﬁmum and supremum of the support of Fi(.). It is useful to restrict
the analysis to rank-preserving wage policies: ﬁrms that oﬀer higher wages to high-ability workers also
oﬀer higher wages to low-ability workers. That is, we use a strictly increasing function b w(.) that links
the two wages oﬀered by any particular ﬁrm such that wL = b w(wH), and hence FL( ˆ w(wH)) = FH(wH)
for all wages wH ∈ [wH,wH].7
When a worker meets a ﬁrm, the worker observes the posted contracts and can choose one of them,
but nothing restricts the worker from choosing the contract the ﬁrm oﬀers to workers of a diﬀerent
ability level. If both contracts are rejected, however, the worker remains in his current state with no
option to recall previously met ﬁrms. We make the following tie-breaking assumptions: an unemployed
worker accepts a wage oﬀer if indiﬀerent to accepting it or remaining unemployed, while an employed
6The implicit assumption here is that the ﬁrm observes total output, but since it employs a mass of workers it is too
costly to observe the output of each individual worker immediately.
7The restriction to rank-preserving wage policies implicitly constrains the set of equilibria that are considered. As we
see later, however, rank preservation arises naturally in situations with binding incentive constraints.
7worker quits only if the wage oﬀer is strictly preferred. Further, a worker reports his true type when
indiﬀerent between misreporting and truth-telling.
There are also job destruction shocks in that each employed worker is displaced into unemployment
according to a Poisson process with parameter δ > 0. Once unemployed, any worker receives a payoﬀ of
b < εLp per unit of time. For simplicity we do not allow that workers of diﬀerent abilities obtain diﬀerent
payoﬀs when unemployed. For example, b can be interpreted as ﬂow income from unemployment
beneﬁts (imposing equal treatment across workers) or as ﬂow utility from leisure (imposing identical
leisure preferences).
2.1 Worker Strategies
Fix a pair of wage-oﬀer distributions FH,FL and an associated function ˆ w. Let Ui denote the expected
value of unemployment of a worker with ability i = L,H. Note that once this worker encounters a
potential employer, the ﬁrm does not observe his ability, so that the worker can claim to be of diﬀerent
ability. Let Vij(w) denote the maximum expected value of employment for a worker with ability i
employed at a ﬁrm oﬀering w after reporting type j. The function b w is helpful to characterize these
value functions as we can think of any worker randomly meeting ﬁrms by drawing high-ability wage
oﬀers from FH. A worker that meets a ﬁrm oﬀering wH observes both wH and wL = b w(wH). The
worker then decides which contract to choose (if any) to maximize expected lifetime utility. Using this
insight and standard dynamic programming arguments, the Bellman equation that describes Ui is given
by
φUi = b + λ
Z wH
wH
max[ViL(b w(x)) − Ui,ViH(x) − Ui,0]dFH(x).
Next consider an employed worker of type i that reported his true type and is earning a wage wi.
Similar arguments as before imply that Vii(wi) solves the following Bellman equation
φVii(wi) = wi + λ
Z wH
wH
max[ViL(b w(x)) − Vii(wi),ViH(x) − Vii(wi),0]dFH(x) + δ(Ui − Vii(wi)). (1)
If this worker misreported his type and is earning wj, however, the value of employment Vij(wj) takes
into account that the worker is set back to unemployment at rate ρ; hence Vij solves
φVij(wj) = wj + λ
Z wH
wH
max[ViL(b w(x)) − Vij(wj),ViH(x) − Vij(wj),0]dFH(x) + (δ + ρ)(Ui − Vij(wj)).
(2)
It is straightforward to verify that any worker’s optimal search strategy is characterized by a reser-
vation wage. Let Rijk(x) denote the reservation wage of a worker who (i) currently receives ﬂow payoﬀ
x, (ii) is of type i = L,H, (iii) has reported (in the case of an employed worker) type j = L,H and
(iv) when meeting a ﬁrm decides to report type k = L,H. Thus, Rijk(x) is deﬁned by Vij(x) = Vik(R).
8The above value functions imply that an unemployed worker of type i accepts a wage oﬀer w′ if and
only if w′ ≥ Rik(b) = b for all i,k = L,H.8
Consider an employed worker of type i that reported his true type and is earning a wage wi. Given
contact with a ﬁrm and revealing his true type once again (i.e. k = i), (1) implies that this worker
accepts employment if and only if the ﬁrm oﬀers a wage w′
i > Riii(wi) = wi. If the worker decides to
misreport his type (i.e. k  = i), however, (1) and (2) imply that the worker accepts employment if and
only if the ﬁrm oﬀers a wage w′
k > Riik(wi) = wi + ρ[Vii(wi) − Ui]. In this case, the worker must be
compensated by the expected loss of misreporting his type.
Now suppose that an employed worker of type i misreported his true type j  = i and is earning a
wage wj. Given contact with a ﬁrm and reporting his true type (k = i), (1) and (2) imply that the
worker accepts employment if and only if the ﬁrm oﬀers a wage w′
i > Riji(wj) = wj −ρ[Vij(wj)−Ui]. In
this case, the worker voluntarily accepts a wage cut as the layoﬀ risk disappears with truth-telling. On
the other hand, if the worker misreports his type once again (k = j), the worker accepts employment
if and only if the ﬁrm oﬀers a wage w′
j > Rijj(wj) = wj.
Note that a worker will not misreport his type whenever the incentive compatibility constraint
Vii(wi) ≥ Vij(wj) holds for any oﬀered pair {wi,wj}. Using (1) and (2), it follows that this is equivalent
to
wj − wi ≤ ρ[Vij(wj) − Ui] . (3)
Namely the ﬂow gain from misreporting on the left side may not exceed the expected loss of a layoﬀ on
the right side.9
2.2 Firms’ Proﬁts
Consider a ﬁrm oﬀering any pair of wages wH, wL. Recall that this ﬁrm does not know the type of
its applicants and, for example, the posted wage wH might attract both type of workers, while wL
does not attract any worker (or vice versa). We denote the ﬁrm’s steady-state proﬁt as Ω(wH,wL) =
P
i=L,H Ωi(wH,wL), where Ωi(wH,wL) describes the ﬁrm’s proﬁt from hires of type i = H,L at the
oﬀered wages. These functions are described in more detail below; they are equilibrium objects that
depend upon workers’ search and truth-telling strategies and the wage-oﬀer distributions. The ﬁrm’s
objective is to choose a pair (wH,wL) to maximize Ω(wH,wL). Equilibrium requires that the optimal
choices of wi must be consistent with the oﬀer distributions Fi(wi) and the associated function b w. We
deﬁne Ω = maxΩ(wH,wL) and now turn to formally deﬁne an equilibrium.
8Assuming that unemployed and employed workers meet ﬁrms at the same rate and have the same ﬂow value of
unemployment considerably simpliﬁes the worker’s problem because all unemployed workers have the same reservation
wage which is independent of ﬁrms’ wage oﬀer strategies. In Section 6 we discuss the implications of diﬀerent reservation
wages.
9Note that it also follows from (1) and (2) that (3) is equivalent to wj − wi ≤ ρ[Vii(wi) − Ui].
92.3 Market Equilibrium
Deﬁnition: A Market Equilibrium is a tuple {b w,Fi(.),Ω,Rijk(.),Vij} for each i,j,k = L,H such that
(i) Firms maximize proﬁts, i.e. Ω(wH,wL) ≤ Ω for all (wH,wL), and
Ω(wH,wL) = Ω and FL(wL) = FH(wH) for all wH ∈ suppFH and wL = ˆ w(wH) .
(ii) Workers’ search and truth-telling strategies are described by reservation wages Rijk(.) and value
functions Vij satisfying (1), (2) and (3).
Before we characterize equilibrium we make some preliminary points. First note that εLp > b
implies that oﬀering wi = b strictly dominates oﬀering wi < b as it generates strictly positive proﬁt.
Hence in any equilibrium ﬁrms oﬀer a set of wages such that min{wL,wH} ≥ b, Ω > 0 and wi ≥ b for
i = L,H.
It is also useful to consider the equilibrium outcomes in the limiting cases when there is no possibility
of learning a worker’s type, ρ = 0, and when, upon a meeting, ﬁrms perfectly observe the worker’s type,
ρ = ∞. These limiting cases have the same structure as the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model and
are useful benchmarks against which we compare our equilibrium allocations.
2.3.1 Perfect Information
When ρ = ∞, ﬁrms are able to perfectly screen their applicants. As in Carrillo-Tudela (2009), this
implies that ﬁrms segment their markets and choose wL and wH independently, each to maximize the
corresponding steady-state proﬁt10
Ωi(wi) =
λ(φ + δ)(εip − wi)αi
[φ + δ + λ(1 − Fi(wi))]2 . (4)
Workers’ reservation wage strategies are such that unemployed workers accept any wage above b and
employed workers of type i earning a wage wi accept any wage w′
i > wi.
In this case, the equilibrium oﬀer distribution for each worker type is given by
Fi(wi) =
￿









In this equilibrium wi = b and wi = εip − [(φ + δ)/(φ + δ + λ)]2(εip − b) for i = L,H.
10Each wage wi attracts the correct worker type and hence the associated hiring ﬂows are hi(wi) = λ[ui+Gi(wi)(αi−ui)],
where ui denotes steady-state unemployment and Gi(.) is the steady-state earnings distribution of type i workers. These
measures follow from steady-state turnover and are derived in a similar way as (12) and (13) below. A job ﬁlled with a
worker of type i has value Ji(wi) = (εip − wi)/[Φ + δ + λ(1 − Fi(wi))]. Then Ωi(wi) = hi(wi)Ji(wi).
10It is easy to verify that εH > εL implies that FH(.) ﬁrst order stochastically dominates FL(.). In
equilibrium more able workers face more frictional wage dispersion and are paid, on average, higher
wages than low-ability workers. At the level of an individual ﬁrm, however, low-ability employees could
potentially receive higher wages than their more able peers; i.e. wL > wH, which is a consequence of
the constant proﬁt condition. A ﬁrm, in equilibrium, is indiﬀerent between posting any wage in the
interval wi ∈ [wi,wi] for a given i = L,H. Our restriction on rank-preserving wage policies rules out
these possibilities, however. That is, rank preservation implies that wage oﬀers are linked according to





(wH − b) . (6)
2.3.2 No Information
In the opposite scenario of no information, ﬁrms treat all worker as having the same average ability
e ε = εHαH + εL(1 − αH). A ﬁrm cannot screen workers and oﬀers the same wage w to any worker it
meets. It follows that b w is uniquely determined by wL = b w(wH) = wH = w. The steady-state proﬁt of
a ﬁrm is then given by11
Ω(w) =
λ(φ + δ)(e εp − w)
[φ + δ + λ(1 − F(w))]2 .
Workers’ reservation wage strategies are such that unemployed workers accept any wage above b and
employed workers earning a wage w accept any wage w′ > w.
Burdett and Mortensen (1998) establish that in this case there exists a unique equilibrium in which
ﬁrms diﬀerentiate their wage policies such that
F(w) =
￿





e εp − w
e εp − w
￿1/2#
.
Similar to the perfect information case w = b and w = e εp−[(φ+δ)/(φ+δ +λ)]2(e εp−b). Compared to
the perfect-information case, low-ability workers are paid on average higher wages, while high-ability
workers are paid lower wages on average. In this case, of course, all workers face the same frictional
wage dispersion.
3 Equilibria with Limited Information
We now explore the case in which (positive and ﬁnite) search and information frictions coexist in the
labor market. We show that when the learning rate of ﬁrms is suﬃciently high, all ﬁrms oﬀer separating
contracts. Both types of workers truthfully reveal their type and self-select into the appropriate wage.
11A ﬁrm oﬀering wage w hires a ﬂow of h(w) = λ[u + G(w)(1 − u)] workers, where u and G are the (unconditional)
steady-state unemployment and earnings distribution (again similar to (12) and (13) below). An employed worker generates
expected proﬁt value J(w) = [˜ εp − w]/[Φ + δ + λ(1 − F(w))]. It follows that Ω(w) = h(w)J(w).
11For lower values of ρ, however, we show there exist segmented equilibria in which low-wage ﬁrms oﬀer
separating contracts, while high-wage ﬁrms oﬀer pooling contracts.
3.1 Non-binding Incentive Constraints
We start by showing that the perfect information equilibrium described in 2.3.1 can be sustained with
limited information, provided that the learning rate ρ is suﬃciently high. Consider such an equilibrium
with wage oﬀer distributions (5) and function b w as in (6). Clearly, only low-ability workers might have
an incentive to misreport their type when ﬁrms cannot learn the worker type immediately. Indeed, the
next result shows that low-ability workers will not misreport their type if and only if ﬁrms learn the
worker’s type suﬃciently fast.
Proposition 1: The perfect information equilibrium where ﬁrms’ wage oﬀers are drawn from distribu-
tions (5) satisfying (6) is an equilibrium in the imperfect information economy if and only if,




It is intuitive that not only fast learning, but also small values of φ, δ, λ and (εH −εL) are conducive
to prevent misreporting: a small ability gap leads to small wage diﬀerentials and thus smaller gains
from misreporting. A low separation rate (φ + δ) or a low job oﬀer arrival rate reduce the incentive to
misreport since workers are more likely to be laid oﬀ once the ﬁrm learns ability.
Now consider values of ρ < ρ1. The next result shows that there is another threshold ρ2 < ρ1,
deﬁned in (9) below, such that, for ρ ∈ (ρ2,ρ1), incentive constraints bind for a fraction of ﬁrms but
are slack for the remaining ﬁrms, and that all ﬁrms oﬀer separating contracts. We fully characterize
this type of equilibrium in Appendix A.
Proposition 2: For values of ρ ∈ [ρ2,ρ1), an equilibrium with wage dispersion exists in which all
ﬁrms oﬀer separating contracts. Incentive constraints bind for a fraction of (low-wage) ﬁrms and they
are slack for the remaining fraction of (high-wage) ﬁrms if ρ > ρ2.
In the case ρ = ρ2, where incentive constraints bind on all ﬁrms, one can calculate the wage oﬀer
distribution explicitly (see Appendix A). Workers of ability i = L,H earn wages wi ∈ [b,wi], with
wL = b +
2(e εp − b)




φ + δ + λ + αHρ












e εp − αLwL −
(φ + δ)2
(φ + δ + λ)2(e εp − b)
￿
. (8)
To verify whether the incentive constraint indeed binds for all ﬁrms, we need to ensure that no ﬁrm
has an incentive to reduce the wage for high-ability workers while oﬀering the same wage to low-ability
12workers (and hence continuing to separate workers at non-binding incentive constraints). In the proof
of Proposition 2, we show that this is true if, and only if,
εLp − wL ≤ (εHp − wH)
φ + δ
φ + δ + ρ
. (9)
Intuitively, if the proﬁt margin for high-ability workers is large relative to the proﬁt margin for low-
ability workers, ﬁrms have no incentive to reduce wH (or to increase wL), and hence incentive constraints
must bind. The binding condition (9) is important as it implicitly deﬁnes the threshold value for
parameter ρ2 beyond which incentive constraints are slack for a fraction of ﬁrms.
Conversely, if ρ is smaller than ρ2, incentive constraints must bind for all ﬁrms oﬀering separating
contracts. However, not all ﬁrms may prefer to oﬀer separating contracts because it can be too costly
to provide the necessary information rents to low-ability workers. We now characterize equilibria for
values of ρ < ρ2 and derive conditions for existence.
3.2 Binding Incentive Constraints
Suppose that ρ ≤ ρ2 and consider a ﬁrm which oﬀers wH to high-ability workers. Regarding the
wage oﬀered to low-ability workers, wL = ˆ w(wH), this ﬁrm has two options. Either, it oﬀers a high
enough wage that is incentive-compatible and prevents low-ability workers from misreporting. Given
that incentive constraints are binding for ρ ≤ ρ2, equation (3) implies that
wL = ˆ w(wH) = wH − ρ[VLH(wH) − UL] . (10)
Such a ﬁrm oﬀers separating contracts to the two workers. Alternatively, the ﬁrm may ﬁnd the contract
to low-ability workers too costly and instead decides to violate the incentive constraint:
wL = ˆ w(wH) < wH − ρ[VLH(wH) − UL] . (11)
In this case, low-ability workers misreport their type when they meet this ﬁrm; they earn wH until
the ﬁrm learns their ability and lays them oﬀ. Equivalently, we can interpret this wage policy as a
pooling contract since this ﬁrm achieves the same outcome by simply oﬀering one contract: a wage
wH in combination with a layoﬀ commitment to low-ability workers. Both worker types accept this
contract, although their expected income patterns diﬀer ex-post. Without loss of generality and to
keep the notation consistent throughout, we will specify the analysis in terms of the equivalent menu
of wages (wH,wL) where wL = ˆ w(wH) and ˆ w satisﬁes (11).
We can prove that separating contracts always dominate pooling contracts at the lower end of
the wage oﬀer distribution. But at higher wages, pooling contracts can possibly dominate separating
contracts.
13Proposition 3: Consider any given distribution of wage oﬀers to high-ability workers FH with support
[b,wH]. Then there is a threshold wage ˜ wH ∈ (b,wH] such that a ﬁrm oﬀers a separating contract if
wH ≤ ˜ wH and a pooling contract if wH > ˜ wH.
To understand why low-wage ﬁrms always prefer to oﬀer separating contracts, consider a ﬁrm oﬀering
wH close to the reservation wage b. For this ﬁrm, it is not very costly to prevent low-ability workers
from misreporting because the worker’s gain from doing so, VLH(wH)−UL, is rather small. Conversely,
when wH is high, the incentive-compatible wage wL is also high and may even exceed the worker’s
marginal product εLp. Then, in some situations, the ﬁrm may decide to oﬀer a pooling contract which
brings about a lower job-retention rate for low-ability workers.
Given the structure of wage policies described in Proposition 3, we characterize an equilibrium where
a fraction η ∈ (0,1] of ﬁrms oﬀer separating contracts and fraction 1−η oﬀering pooling contracts, with
η to be endogenously determined below. Separating ﬁrms oﬀer wH ∈ [b, ˜ wH] to high-ability workers
and the incentive-compatible wage wL = ˆ w(wH) ≤ ˜ wL to low-ability workers, satisfying (10) with e wL =
b w(e wH). Pooling ﬁrms target high-ability workers by oﬀering wH > e wH and wL = ˆ w(wH), violating
the incentive-compatibility constraint (i.e. satisfying (11)). Given the rank-preservation property, we
maintain that function ˆ w is strictly increasing and continuous.12
This equilibrium structure has the following implications. First, as the reservation wage of all
unemployed workers is given by b, they again accept any job oﬀered. An employed worker of high
ability always reports his true type, and hence accepts a job if it oﬀers a wage strictly above the one
he is currently earning. Similarly, if a low-ability worker employed in a ﬁrm earning wL ≤ e wL meets
another ﬁrm oﬀering w′
L ≤ e wL, he accepts the job oﬀer if he is promised a wage w′
L > wL. If this
worker meets a ﬁrm oﬀering a wage w′
H > ˜ wH, the worker will also accept the oﬀer and misreport
the type. Lastly, consider a low-ability worker that is earning wH ≥ e wH before the ﬁrm learns ability.
This worker then accepts any wage w′
H > wH from another ﬁrm. If the worker meets any ﬁrm oﬀering
w′
L ≤ ˜ wL, it follows that the worker will not accept such an oﬀer.13
Note that the same arguments as in Burdett and Mortensen (1998) guarantee that any equilibrium
wage oﬀer distribution FH is continuous and has connected support. In turn, FL does not exhibit any
mass points either and it also has connected support. Also note that no low-ability worker is employed
at wages w ∈ (e wL, e wH], and hence the earnings distribution of low-ability workers has no connected
support if η < 1. We now proceed to solve for equilibrium.
12It follows from diﬀerentiation of (10) that the right-hand side in (10) is strictly increasing (see also (18) below). Hence,
a strictly increasing function ˆ w satisfying (11) exists. The exact shape of this function is clearly irrelevant for equilibrium
because all low-ability workers misreport their type when contacted by this type of ﬁrm.
13The current job strictly dominates truth-telling at the current employer which itself strictly dominates the outside
oﬀer w
′
L ≤ ˜ wL < wL = ˆ w(wH) and VLL(wL) < VLH(wH).
143.2.1 Steady-state Measures
To simplify notation, it is useful to let the quit rate of high-ability workers earning wH be denoted by
q(wH) ≡ φ + δ + λ(1 − FH(wH)) and note that η = FH(e wH). Given the reservation wage strategies
described above, we show in Appendix C that steady-state turnover implies that unemployment of
workers of both types is given by
uH =
(φ + δ)αH
φ + δ + λ
and uL =
q(e wH)
q(e wH) + ρ
(φ + δ + ρ)αL
φ + δ + λ
, (12)
and the proportion of employed workers of high type earning a wage w′





Further, for all wL ∈ [b, e wL], the earnings distribution of low-ability workers is given by
GL(wL) =
q(e wH)(φ + δ + ρ)FH(b w−1(wL))
(q(e wH) + ρη)q(b w−1(wL))
. (14)
The earnings distribution for all w ∈ [e wH,wH] is given by
GL(wH) =
(φ + δ + ρ)[ηρ + q(e wH)FH(wH)]
(q(wH) + ρ)(q(e wH) + ρη)
. (15)
3.2.2 Firms’ Payoﬀs
Consider a separating ﬁrm that oﬀers wH ≤ e wH to high-ability workers and wL = b w(wH) ≤ e wL to
low-ability workers. Given that job applicants correctly report their type when meeting this ﬁrm, the
hiring ﬂows are hi(wi) = λui + λGi(wi)(αi − ui), for i = L,H. Using (12), (13) and (14), this ﬁrm’s
steady-state proﬁt is given by14
ΩS(wH,wL) =
λθ(η)αL(εLp − wL) + λ(φ + δ)αH(εHp − wH)
q(wH)2 . (16)
where θ(η) ≡ [(φ + δ + ρ)(φ + δ + λ(1 − η)]/[φ + δ + ρ + λ(1 − η)].
Now consider a pooling ﬁrm that oﬀers wH > e wH to high-ability workers and a non-incentive-
compatible wage to low-ability workers. Since low-ability workers misreport their type when meeting
this ﬁrm, the hiring ﬂows associated with posting wH equals hi(wH) = λui + λGi(wH)(αi − ui), for
i = L,H. Using (12), (13) and (15), implies that this ﬁrm’s steady-state proﬁt is given by
ΩP(wH,wL) =
λ(φ + δ + ρ)αL (εLp − wH)
(q(wH) + ρ)2 +
λ(φ + δ)αH(εHp − wH)
q(wH)2 . (17)
14Appendix C contains a full derivation of the expressions in (16) and (17).
153.2.3 Wage-Oﬀer Distributions
To solve for the equilibrium wage oﬀer distributions, ﬁrst consider a ﬁrm that oﬀers a menu of wages
(wH,wL) such that low-ability workers do not misreport their type, i.e. the binding incentive constraint






subject to b w(b) = b.
Further, in any equilibrium a ﬁrm oﬀering wH ≤ e wH with associated wage wL = b w(wH) must
be indiﬀerent between this contract and the reservation wage contract such that ΩS(wH, b w(wH)) =
ΩS(b,b). Diﬀerentiation of this equation together with (18) gives the following result.
Lemma 1: Given η ≤ 1, the wage oﬀer distribution FH(.) solves the ﬁrst-order diﬀerential equation
F′
H(wH) =
(φ + δ + λ)2
2λ[(φ + δ)αH(εHp − b) + θ(η)αL(εLp − b)]
￿
ρ(φ + δ)αH + [(φ + δ)αH + θ(η)αL]q(wH)
q(wH)[q(wH) + ρ]
￿
for all w ∈ [b, e wH], subject to FH(b) = 0.
The wage e wH is determined by FH(e wH) = η, for any given η ≤ 1. The corresponding wage e wL =
b w(e wH) then follows from integration of (18). Denote these solutions e wH(η) and e wL(η) = b w(e wH(η)),
respectively. In Appendix C we provide a closed-form solution for e wL and e wH.
Next consider a ﬁrm oﬀering a wage wH > e wH. Equilibrium requires that the proﬁts of this ﬁrm must
satisfy ΩP(wH,wL) = ΩS(b,b). Substituting out the corresponding expressions leads to the following
characterization of the wage oﬀer distribution for wH > e wH.
Lemma 2: Given η < 1, the wage oﬀer distribution FH(.) solves the ﬁrst-order diﬀerential equation
F′
H(wH) =
q(wH)(q(wH) + ρ)[(φ + δ)αH(q(wH) + ρ)2 + (φ + δ + ρ)αLq(wH)2]
2λ[(φ + δ)αH(εHp − wH)(q(wH) + ρ)3 + (φ + δ + ρ)αL(εLp − wH)q(wH)3]
for all w ∈ (e wH,wH], subject to FH(e wH) = η.
Similar to Lemma 1, we require FH(wH) = 1 to characterize the upper bound wH. Let the solution
to this upper bound be denoted wH(η).
The distribution of wage oﬀers for low-ability workers follows directly from FL(wL) = FH( ˆ w−1(wL))
for wL ∈ [b,wL) with FL(wL) = 1. Hence, the above characterizes the equilibrium solutions for FH(.;η),
FL(.;η), e wH(η), e wL(η) and wH(η), for a given η ≤ 1.
3.2.4 Characterization and Existence
The ﬁnal step is to derive the equilibrium fraction η∗. Given that equilibrium requires η∗ > 0, there are
two possible cases: (i) Segmented equilibria in which η∗ ∈ (0,1) and separating and pooling contracts
16coexist. (ii) Equilibria in which η∗ = 1 and all ﬁrms oﬀer separating contracts. We analyze each
in turn. When separating and pooling contracts coexist, ﬁrms must be indiﬀerent between the two
types of contract. In particular, at the threshold wage ˜ wH, this necessitates ΩS(e wH(η), e wL(η)) =
ΩP(e wH(η), e wL(η)). Using (16) and (17), this condition implies that η∗ ∈ (0,1) must solve the following
ﬁxed point problem
η = T(η) ≡
φ + δ + λ
λ
−
ρ[e wL(η) − εLp]
λ[e wH(η) − e wL(η)]
, (19)
where e wH(η) follows from Lemma 1 with FH(e wH(η)) = η and e wL(η) from (18). In the case in which all
ﬁrms oﬀer separating contracts, equilibrium requires that ΩS(e wH(η), e wL(η))) ≥ ΩP(e wH(η), ˜ wL(η)) at
η = 1. With T deﬁned in (19), this is equivalent to T(1) ≥ 1 being a necessary condition for existence
of a pure separating equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 1 below shows that the function T has at most one ﬁxed point and that a
unique equilibrium exists. We also prove that equilibrium is segmented, i.e. some ﬁrms oﬀer pooling
contracts, provided that the learning rate ρ is suﬃciently low and a parameter condition is satisﬁed.
Theorem 1: A Market Equilibrium with η∗ ∈ (0,1] exists and is unique. Moreover, if
λ2(˜ εp − b) > (φ + δ + λ)2(εLp − b) (20)
holds, there is a threshold value ρ3 ∈ (0,ρ2) such that pooling and separating contracts coexist if ρ < ρ3.
Otherwise all ﬁrms oﬀer separating contracts.
Condition (20) is a necessary condition for pooling contracts to be proﬁtable for the highest-wage
ﬁrms. Intuitively, if productivity of low-ability workers is relatively low and the wage-oﬀer distribution is
suﬃciently dispersed (λ is suﬃciently large), it is too costly for high-wage ﬁrms to provide the necessary
information rents to separate low-ability workers, so that a pooling contract with ﬁring of low-ability
workers is the more attractive option. In the proof of Theorem 1 we show that the threshold value ρ3
is the implicit solution of equation
(φ + δ)(wH − wL) = ρ(wL − εLp) , (21)
with wL and wH deﬁned by (7) and (8). The proof also reveals that at the threshold wage and beyond,
ﬁrms make negative proﬁts on low-ability workers: εLp < ˜ wL(η) < ˜ wH(η). This implies that the ﬁring
of low-ability workers at high-wage ﬁrms is ex-post optimal.
Propositions 1, 2 and Theorem 1 together imply that the set of equilibria can be partitioned in
terms of the degree of information frictions through the ﬁrms’ learning rate. Figure 1 depicts this
partition. For values of ρ < ρ3, those ﬁrms who oﬀer the highest wages ﬁnd it too costly to oﬀer
incentive-compatible contracts to low-ability workers. They instead decide to oﬀer pooling contracts.
These contracts are accepted by both worker types, but low-ability workers have lower job-retention
rates. For values of ρ ≥ ρ3 all ﬁrms oﬀer separating contracts. Incentive constraints bind for all ﬁrms
if ρ < ρ2 and for a fraction of ﬁrms if ρ ∈ [ρ2,ρ1); incentive constraints are slack for all ﬁrms if ρ ≥ ρ1.
17Figure 1: Set of equilibria parameterized by ρ
4 Implications
In this section we analyze some of the implications for labor turnover and wage dispersion. First, we
show that in a segmented equilibrium low-ability workers have a higher degree of turnover and they
are underrepresented in high-wage ﬁrms (oﬀering pooling contracts) and overrepresented in low-wage
ﬁrms (oﬀering separating contracts). Formally, using (36) and (37) in Appendix C, the workforce sizes








respectively; while for a pooling ﬁrm oﬀering wH > e wH(η) these measures are given by
nP
L(wH) =
λ(φ + δ + ρ)αL




It is then easy to verify that ﬁrms oﬀering separating contracts have a higher proportion of low-ability
workers in their workforces, while ﬁrms oﬀering pooling contracts have a higher proportion of high-
ability workers. Furthermore, since (23) implies that nP
H(wH)/(nP
L(wH) + nP
L(wH)) is increasing in
wH, the proportion of high-ability workers is increasing in wH among pooling ﬁrms. The intuition
is that high-wage ﬁrms are able to attract and retain more workers of both types, while they detect
misreporting low-ability workers at the same rate ρ, independent of the oﬀered wage. We summarize
these ﬁndings as follows.
18Proposition 4: If ρ ≥ ρ3, both worker types have the same turnover patterns, and all ﬁrms have the
same ability composition of the workforce. If ρ < ρ3, low-ability workers have higher turnover rates.
Firms oﬀering pooling contracts (high-wage ﬁrms) have a more productive workforce than ﬁrms oﬀering
separating contracts (low-wage ﬁrms). Among high-wage ﬁrms, the workforce productivity is increasing
in wH.
A further immediate consequence of our model is that low-ability workers have higher unemployment
as they are more likely to be laid oﬀ at ﬁrms oﬀering pooling contracts. This implies that total output is
lower in the economy with small information frictions (0 < ρ < ρ3), both relative to the full-information
benchmark and relative to the no-information case (ρ = 0).
4.1 Numerical Example
Since our model cannot be fully solved in closed form, we use a numerical example to illustrate how
wage dispersion changes with information frictions and to study the relation between wages, ﬁrm size
and workforce ability.
Consider the following parametrization. Set the time period to a month and let φ = 0.0018 reﬂect an
average working life of 45 years. Following Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2010), set δ = 0.036 and
λ = 0.13 to roughly match the average separation and job-to-job transition rates in the US economy.
We choose εL = 1 and εH = 2 arbitrarily and let αH = 0.75, αL = 0.25. We normalize p = 1 and set
b = p(αHεH +αLεL)/2 = 0.75; this choice implies that unemployment income is at roughly 65% of the
average wage. We set ρ = 0.16 as a benchmark. This number implies that on average ﬁrms learn their
employees’ true type after six months of employment.
The above parametrization implies that in equilibrium 69.2 percent of ﬁrms oﬀer separating contracts
(i.e. η∗ = 0.692). It also implies that ρ1 = 1.34, ρ2 = 0.86 and ρ3 = 0.52. That is, pure separating
equilibria can only be sustained when ﬁrms learn the true type of their workers on average at the second
month, 1/ρ3, of employment. Given that the latter number seems to require very fast learning from
employers, a segmented equilibrium is quite plausible in our benchmark parametrization.
4.1.1 Wage Dispersion
In equilibrium separating ﬁrms compress the wages oﬀered to the two types so as to enforce self-selection
of low-ability workers. As implied by Theorem 1, some ﬁrms oﬀer wages above the productivity of low-
ability workers, with e wL(η∗) = 1.205 and e wH(η∗) = 1.625. In turn, the wage policies of these ﬁrms aﬀect
the wages oﬀered to high-ability workers by pooling ﬁrms. In particular, the highest wage oﬀered to
high-ability workers is wH(η∗) = 1.883, which is smaller than the upper bound in the perfect information
case where wH = 1.943.

































































Figure 2: Mean wages and coeﬃcients of variation for GL and GH and varying ρ.
Note that the earnings distributions GH and GL reﬂect wage dispersion that arises purely due to
search and information frictions. By computing their standard deviations, the benchmark parametriza-
tion implies that low-ability workers face a more dispersed distribution and hence more frictional wage
dispersion than high-ability workers. Figure 2 depicts the mean and coeﬃcient of variation (cv) of
these distributions as we change the ﬁrms’ learning rate. As we increase ρ from zero (no informa-
tion) to ρ3 = 0.52 (where all ﬁrms oﬀer separating contracts), e wL(η) decreases and e wH(η) and wH(η)
increase. While the mean and the cv of GH increase and the mean of GL decreases, the cv of GL
follows a non-monotonic pattern. When ρ is increased further, all these moments move in the di-
rection of their perfect information values.15 Conversely, as ρ → 0 the equilibrium converges to the
no-information case described in Section 2.3.2. All ﬁrms oﬀer an identical wage to both worker types
such that wL = wH = w ∈ [b,w], where w = e εp − [(φ + δ)/(φ + δ + λ)]2(e εp − b) = 1.706. In this
equilibrium the ﬁrm never learns the worker’s true type, so it is unable to separate workers or to ﬁre
low-ability workers later on.16
For values of ρ < 0.43, where separating and pooling contracts coexist in the market, low-ability
workers face higher frictional wage dispersion than high-ability workers. For higher values of ρ the
opposite holds. Intuitively, as ρ increases away from zero, the wage oﬀer distribution to high-ability
workers becomes a bit more dispersed. At the same time, there is a group of low-ability workers who
earn temporarily rather high wages (w > ˜ wH) while many others earn low wages at separating ﬁrms
(w < ˜ wL). This segmentation dramatically drives up wage dispersion for low-ability workers. As ρ
15Figure 2 shows the mean and the cv for ρ ≤ ρ3 = 0.52. For ρ > ρ3 both measure converge monotonically to their
perfect information values which are E(wH) = 1.75, E(wL) = 0.97, cv(wH) = 0.137, cv(wL) = 0.027.
16Interestingly, in the limit ρ → 0, equilibrium is segmented with a share η = 0.49 of ﬁrms oﬀering separating contracts.
However, since all “separating” ﬁrms oﬀer nearly the same wage to any worker they meet, and “pooling” ﬁrms never (in
the limit) ﬁre workers, the equilibrium structure is identical to the one of the no-information case.
20increases further, however, the fraction of separating ﬁrms η converges to unity and almost all workers
are employed in separating ﬁrms which reduces dispersion.17
4.1.2 Ability, Firm Size and Wages
Proposition 4 shows that low-ability workers have a higher degree of turnover than high-ability workers.
This turnover pattern generates a positive relation between workforce productivity, ﬁrm size, and wage
strategies. First recall that ﬁrms oﬀering pooling contracts have a higher proportion of high-ability








L(b w(wH)) + nS
H(wH)]dFH(wH) ,









The numerical solution for the above expressions shows that the average size of the workforce in pooling
ﬁrms is greater than that of separating ﬁrms; E(nS) = 0.443 and E(nP) = 1.389. This result shows
that, in our benchmark parametrization, ﬁrms that employ a more productive workforce are bigger
on average. Obviously, pooling ﬁrms oﬀer higher wages than separating ﬁrms; in our parametrization
we compute the average wages oﬀered by the two types of ﬁrms as E(wS) = 1.21 and E(wP) = 1.76.
Hence, ﬁrms that employ a more productive workforce are, on average, bigger and pay higher wages
(see Brown and Medoﬀ (1989) for empirical evidence of this relationship).18
5 Firm Heterogeneity and Sorting
We now extend our basic model to include heterogeneity in ﬁrm productivity. The main aim is to
analyze whether there exists sorting by types. That is, do more productive ﬁrms attract and retain a
more productive workforce? We show that such a sorting pattern obtains in our adverse selection model,
although it does not obtain in the corresponding perfect information or no information benchmarks.
Sorting equilibria are consistent with empirical evidence showing that the positive relation between ﬁrm
17The general properties of these graphs remain unchanged when we alter the share of low-ability workers αL. For
example, increasing αL implies that cvL intersects cvH at lower values of ρ, while reducing αL generates the opposite
eﬀect.
18It is important to note that when separating and pooling contracts coexist, the relationship between ﬁrm size and
wages is not monotonic as in the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model. Although there is a positive relation between ﬁrm
size and wages oﬀered within each type of ﬁrm, it is easy to verify that the size of a ﬁrm oﬀering e wH is greater than the
size of the a ﬁrm oﬀering e wH + ε, ε > 0 is suﬃciently small. Among pooling ﬁrms, the relation between wages, ﬁrm size
and workforce productivity is monotonic, however (see Proposition 4).
21size and wages is not only due to the fact that high-wage ﬁrms have a more productive workforce, but
that these ﬁrms are themselves more productive (see Haltiwanger et al. 1999).
The formal analysis of this case is very similar to the one with homogeneous ﬁrms and is relegated
to Appendix B. Here we present some important results and a numerical solution to such a model. Let
βH denote the fraction of ﬁrms with high productivity pH and βL = 1 − βH the fraction of ﬁrms with
low productivity pL. A worker with ability εi employed at a ﬁrm with productivity pk then generates
ﬂow output εipk for i,k = L,H. Let Fi(wi | pk) denote the proportion of ﬁrms with productivity k
oﬀering a wage no greater than wi to workers of ability i, for i,k = L,H. Further, let wik and wik denote
the inﬁmum and the supremum of the support of Fi(. | pk). Lemma a.1 in Appendix B shows that in
equilibrium more productive ﬁrms oﬀer higher wages than less productive ﬁrms, and that separating
ﬁrms oﬀer lower wages than pooling ﬁrms. There are then two equilibrium conﬁgurations of interest:
Equilibria in which η ∈ (0,βL) such that low-productivity ﬁrms oﬀer separating and pooling contracts
and all high-productivity ﬁrms oﬀer pooling contracts; and equilibria in which η ∈ (βL,1] and all low-
productivity ﬁrms oﬀer separating contracts, while high-productivity ﬁrms oﬀer separating and pooling
contracts. Again, equations (22) and (23) imply that pooling ﬁrms have a more productive workforce
than separating ﬁrms. Furthermore, among pooling ﬁrms, the workforce productivity is increasing in
the oﬀered wage. This directly yields the following result:
Proposition 5: Consider a segmented equilibrium in which one type of ﬁrms oﬀer either separating or
pooling contracts. Then some (or all) high-productivity ﬁrms employ a higher proportion of high-ability
workers than low-productivity ﬁrms.
Hence there is positive sorting of workers among ﬁrms. The degree of sorting depends on the value
of η. For η < βL all high-productivity ﬁrms have a higher proportion of high-ability workers, while for
η > βL only some high-productivity ﬁrms have a higher proportion of these workers. In both cases,
positive sorting obtains.
As in the homogeneous case, total output is reduced because low-ability workers have lower em-
ployment rates than high-ability workers in any segmented equilibrium. With ﬁrm heterogeneity, the
positive sorting entails an additional loss of output relative to the no-sorting benchmarks that obtain
under either full information or no information. The explanation is as follows. The turnover pattern of
high-ability workers does not depend on the amount of information: their relative employment shares
do not vary with the ﬁrms’ learning rate. Low-ability workers, however, are more likely to be employed
in low-productivity ﬁrms when information frictions are suﬃciently strong. Hence, low-productivity
ﬁrms employ a larger share of the total labor force, which ultimately reduces aggregate output. We
note that this loss of output due to sorting also emerges in the variation of this model where ﬁrms cut
wages instead of ﬁring misreporting workers and where all workers have the same employment rates
(see Section 6.1).
225.1 Numerical Example
To solve the model we use the characterization of e wH(η), e wL(η), wHk(η), FH(. | pk), FH(.), η for
k = L,H and the equilibrium conditions described in Appendix B. We use the same parameter values
as before, but set pL = 1 and pH = 1.1. The value of βL becomes important to determine which type
of equilibrium is obtained. We consider two values for βL ∈ {0.5,0.9} to show the properties of the
model in each case and to reﬂect the decreasing probability mass function observed in empirical ﬁrm
productivity distributions (see Lentz and Mortensen (2008)).
In the case of βL = 0.9, we have that η∗ = 0.744, wHL = wHH = 1.615, and wHH = 1.797.
All high-productivity ﬁrms oﬀer pooling contracts, whereas low-productivity ﬁrms oﬀer both types of
contracts. As should be expected, the average size of high-productivity ﬁrms is greater than that of low-
productivity ﬁrms, EH(nP) = 2.073 > EL(nP + nS) = 0.592. Further, low-productivity ﬁrms employ
a larger share of low-ability workers (27%) compared to high-productivity ﬁrms (7.4%). Under perfect
information (or with zero information), in contrast, both types of ﬁrms have a balanced workforce.
Relative to these no-sorting situations, low-productivity ﬁrms employ a larger number of low-ability
workers but the same number of high-ability workers. Hence total output is lower under asymmetric
information (1.361 relative to 1.4 without sorting).
Now let βL = 0.5. In this case we have that η∗ = 0.843, wHL = wHH = 1.495, and wHH = 2.008.
Then all low-productivity ﬁrms separate workers whereas high-productivity ﬁrms oﬀer both pooling
and separating contracts. Again, the average size of high-productivity ﬁrms is greater than that of
low-productivity ﬁrms, EH(nP + nS) = 1.192 > EL(nS) = 0.313, and low-productivity ﬁrms employ a
larger share of low-ability workers than high-productivity ﬁrms (31.8% relative to 20.4%). The output
loss of asymmetric information is tiny in this example (1.441 compared to 1.466 without sorting).
Note that in both cases the average wages earned in high-productivity ﬁrms are higher than the
average wages earned in low-productivity ﬁrms. Hence, more productive ﬁrms not only employ a more
productive workforce, but they also oﬀer, on average, higher wages and are bigger than less productive
ﬁrms.
6 Robustness
In this section we relax several of the assumptions made earlier. We argue that the qualitative features
of the benchmark model still hold in each of the following extensions.
6.1 Wage Cuts
In the benchmark model we assume that a layoﬀ is the only form of punishment for a misreporting
worker. An alternative is to allow the ﬁrm to cut the wage of these workers, while maintaining the
23assumption that ﬁrms oﬀer ﬂat-wage contracts for all workers who report truthfully. In this case, it
is easy to see that cutting the wage of the misreporting worker to his reservation wage dominates the
ﬁring of this worker. By using the alternative punishment, the ﬁrm continues to extract rents out of
this worker (at least for some time), while it is an equally strong threat as it provides the same expected
payoﬀ to the worker as a layoﬀ. We now brieﬂy explore the implications of this variation. Details are
available from the authors upon request.
First note that Propositions 1 and 2 are exactly the same in this case. It is only when incentive
constraints bind for all ﬁrms that the analysis is modiﬁed. In particular, we can extend Proposition 3
to show that low-wage ﬁrms always oﬀer separating contracts, and we can also show that segmented
equilibria exist where a fraction of high-wage ﬁrms oﬀer pooling contracts, particularly when the learning
rate is suﬃciently low. In any segmented equilibrium, the equilibrium fraction of separating ﬁrms η
solves the ﬁxed point problem
η = b T(η) ≡
(φ + δ + λ)
λ(εLp − b)
￿
(e wL(η) − b) − [e wH(η) − e wL(η)]
￿




where e wL(η) and e wH(η) are obtained in the same way as in the benchmark model. Furthermore, b T is
an increasing and convex function of η with b T(0) = b T′(0) = 0, such that b T(1) > 1 implies the existence
of a segmented equilibrium; conversely if b T(1) ≤ 1, all ﬁrms oﬀer separating contracts.
In a segmented equilibrium, pooling ﬁrms cut wages of low-ability workers. Again, these work-
ers have higher turnover rates than high-ability workers, and pooling (high-wage) ﬁrms have a more
productive workforce than separating (low-wage) ﬁrms. All workers have the same employment rates,
however. Numerical examples show that the main implications for wage dispersion and for the relation
between ﬁrm size, workforce productivity and wages still hold in this case. An interesting diﬀerence,
however, is that pooling ﬁrms oﬀer higher wages to high-ability workers than in the benchmark model.
This follows because these ﬁrms gain more from low-ability worker once they are paid their reservation
wage after being caught misreporting. Hence they can bid more aggressively for high-ability workers.
When ﬁrms have heterogeneous productivity, the analysis presented in the benchmark model remains
basically unchanged. In particular, the sorting pattern described in Proposition 5 extends to this case.
6.2 Limited Commitment on Firing
In the benchmark model we assume that ﬁrms are able to commit to ﬁre misreporting workers. Likewise,
they are able to commit not to ﬁre workers who report their ability truthfully. As we show in the
proof of Theorem 1, in equilibrium only those workers are ﬁred who actually yield losses to the ﬁrm;
hence equilibrium ﬁring is ex-post optimal in the benchmark model. Nonetheless, on the equilibrium
path, some separating ﬁrms retain low-ability workers even though they yield losses (the ﬁrms oﬀering
wL ∈ (εLp, ˜ wL]). Ex-post these ﬁrms would prefer to ﬁre these workers. Furthermore, all oﬀ-equilibrium
24punishment strategies rest on the commitment assumption. What would happen if ﬁrms can only
commit to a ﬂat wage but are unable to commit to a ﬁring policy?
Any limitation on commitment clearly makes it more diﬃcult for ﬁrms to separate workers. Specif-
ically, at the lowest wages ﬁrms are not able to credibly announce that they will ﬁre misreporting
workers. Those low-ability workers who misreport high ability and earn wH < εLp would still yield
positive proﬁt, so ﬁrms would like to retain these workers ex-post. Hence, low-wage ﬁrms will only be
able to oﬀer pooling contracts; these are accepted by both types of workers and no worker will be ﬁred.
Conversely, at the highest wages ﬁrms are unable to separate workers because they cannot commit to
retain low-ability workers earning wages wL = ˆ w(wH) > εLp. These ﬁrms, again, can only oﬀer pooling
contracts, but they would ﬁre low-ability workers (as they do in the benchmark model if ρ < ρ3). The
only ﬁrms that are able to separate workers are those oﬀering wH ≥ εLp ≥ wL = ˆ w(wH): these ﬁrms
credibly ﬁre misreporting workers and they credibly retain truthful workers of low ability. Therefore,
the equilibrium patterns are very similar to those of the benchmark model. As long as a positive fraction
of high-wage ﬁrms oﬀer pooling contracts and ﬁre low-ability workers, the main qualitative predictions
remain the same.
6.3 Diﬀerent Reservation Wages
Our assumptions that unemployment income is the same for all workers and that job arrival rates are
the same for employed and for unemployed workers imply that workers of both types have the same
reservation wage. If any of these two assumptions is violated, reservation wages would diﬀer. For
example, if unemployed workers have a higher job-arrival rate than employed workers, the reservation
wage exceeds unemployment income since unemployed workers want to be compensated for giving up
the higher option value of search. Since high-ability workers draw higher wage oﬀers from ﬁrms oﬀering
separating contracts, they also have a higher reservation wage. How does the equilibrium structure
change when high-ability workers have a higher reservation wage?
A ﬁrst observation is that the full-information outcome cannot be an equilibrium, even when the
ﬁrms’ learning rate is very large (that is, Proposition 1 fails). To see this, note that the full-information
outcome has wage oﬀer distributions Fi whose lower bounds are the corresponding reservation wages
RH > RL. But then for any ﬁnite ρ, no matter how large, low-ability workers employed at their
reservation wage (or at any wage close to it) would misreport their type: They could earn the higher
reservation wage of high-ability worker temporarily, but they would not suﬀer from a layoﬀ which gives
the same utility as truth-telling.
This implies that any equilibrium with ﬁnite ρ must involve binding incentive constraints, at least
at the lowest wages. In particular, the ﬁrm with the lowest wage oﬀer to high-ability workers wH = RH
must provide some rents to low-ability workers, wL = ˆ w(RH) > RL, if it wants to enforce truth-telling.
At higher wages, as in our benchmark model, some ﬁrms possibly ﬁnd it proﬁtable to oﬀer pooling
25contracts for high-ability workers. At the same time, however, there can also be a fraction of ﬁrms that
decide to oﬀer pooling contracts exclusively for low-ability workers at the lowest wages wL ∈ [RL,w0
L]
with some w0
L < RH. Such an outcome would resemble features of the Albrecht and Axell (1984) model
where a fraction of ﬁrms hire only low-reservation-wage workers while others hire all types of workers
at higher wages. As long as some ﬁrms in the higher wage range oﬀer pooling contracts to high-ability
workers, our main implications remain intact, however: low-ability workers have higher turnover, and
they are underrepresented in high-wage ﬁrms and overrepresented in low-wage ﬁrms (and even more so
when pooling contracts for low-ability workers are oﬀered).
6.4 Information on Workers’ Employment Status
There is a large literature that consider the implications of adverse selection for unemployment (see
Greenwald (1986), Gibbons and Katz (1991), and Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004), among others). In these
models the composition of unemployed workers becomes biased towards low-ability ones as ﬁrms lay oﬀ
these workers more frequently. As a consequence the re-employment wages of all unemployed workers
decrease due to adverse selection.19 In our model, a segmented equilibrium implies that low-ability
workers experience unemployment more often than high-ability workers and hence the unemployment
rate is also biased towards low-ability workers. This can imply that ﬁrms have an incentive to further
diﬀerentiate their contracts based on the employment status of their applicants.
Even without adverse selection, however, ﬁrms in the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) framework have
an incentive to diﬀerentiate their wage oﬀers by employment status so as to extract additional rents; see
Carrillo-Tudela (2009) for a formal analysis. If all unemployed workers have the same reservation wage,
information on employment status perfectly reveals the lowest wage the ﬁrm has to oﬀer to hire from
the unemployment pool. In equilibrium, the oﬀer distribution faced by unemployed workers degenerates
to a mass point at the reservation wage. For employed workers, the equilibrium oﬀer distribution is
characterized by the Burdett-Mortensen distribution, where the inﬁmum of this distribution equals
the reservation wage. When unemployed workers have diﬀerent reservation wages, the oﬀer distribution
faced by these workers is similar to the one described in Albrecht and Axell (1984). The oﬀer distribution
for employed workers continues to be described by the one of the Burdett-Mortensen model.
The arguments in Carrillo-Tudela (2009) can also be applied under adverse selection. In particular,
in the benchmark model all ﬁrms oﬀer unemployed workers their reservation wage, but they diﬀeren-
tiate their contracts (either oﬀering separating or pooling contracts) when hiring employed workers as
described in Section 3.2. Hence our main implications are not altered in this case. When workers have
diﬀerent reservation wages the analysis becomes more cumbersome. The arguments in Carrillo-Tudela
(2009), however, suggest that the oﬀer distribution faced by unemployed worker will be described by
19It is important to note that in these models ﬁrms are (by assumption) not allowed to oﬀer separating contracts.
26two mass points each at the corresponding reservation wages. Our conjecture is that the higher pro-
portion of low-ability workers in the unemployment pool will mainly aﬀect the dispersion of the oﬀer
distribution faced by unemployed workers.20
7 Conclusions
In this paper we consider a model of the labor market in which search frictions coexist with information
frictions. The latter arise as ﬁrms do not observe worker ability upon hiring but gradually learn it over
time. Given this adverse selection problem, we show that when the learning rate is suﬃciently low, a
unique equilibrium emerges in which low-wage ﬁrms attempt to hire both low- and high-ability workers
by oﬀering incentive-compatible separating contracts. High-wage ﬁrms oﬀer contracts that intend to
retain only high-ability workers. In such a segmented equilibrium, low-ability workers have a higher
degree of turnover and a more dispersed earnings distribution, and they are underrepresented in high-
wage ﬁrms. We also show, under reasonable parameter values, that there is a positive relation between
wages, ﬁrm size and the productivity of the workforce, in line with empirical results.
We extend our model and introduce ﬁrm heterogeneity to show that a segmented equilibrium implies
positive sorting of workers among ﬁrms. High-productivity ﬁrms employ a more productive workforce,
and low-ability workers are overrepresented in low-productivity ﬁrms. Total output is lower both
relative to the no-information outcome where ﬁrms are unable to separate workers and relative to an
equilibrium where all ﬁrms oﬀer separating contracts, as is the case under perfect information. We also
show that more productive ﬁrms oﬀer, on average, higher wages, they are bigger and employ a more
productive workforce, in line with the empirical evidence of Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) and
Haltiwanger, Lane, and Spletzer (1999).
This paper restricts attention to ﬂat-wage contracts. However, Burdett and Coles (2003) and
Stevens (2004) show that with on-the-job search ﬁrms beneﬁt from oﬀering upward-sloping wage-tenure
contracts to reduce workers’ quit probability. Our choice of contract space is motivated to preserve a
tractable analysis while considering two-sided heterogeneity; it is also based on evidence related to the
lack of wage-tenure eﬀects found in empirical studies. Nevertheless, adding this feature to the model is
of interest as it would allow us to analyze the joint eﬀects of adverse selection and search frictions in a
more general contract space. We leave this extension for future research.
20All these arguments rely on equilibria in which the supports of the oﬀer distributions faced by unemployed workers do
not overlap with the oﬀer distributions faced by employed workers. As shown in Carrillo-Tudela (2009), it seems diﬃcult
to rule out equilibria with non-overlapping supports when ﬁrms are heterogeneous.
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30A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
First note that a low-ability worker reports the correct type if and only if VLH(wH)−VLL(b w(wH)) ≤
0. Monotonicity of b w and the Bellman equations (1) and (2) then imply that this condition can be
expressed as
VLH(wH) − VLL(b w(wH)) =
b w−1(wL) − wL + ρ[UL − VLL(wL)]
φ + δ + ρ + λ(1 − FL(wL))
≤ 0.
Since the lowest paying ﬁrm oﬀers wL = wH = b and hence UL = VLL(b) = VLH(b), the above and (6)
imply that low-ability workers will self-select into the correct contract if and only if,
ϕ(wL) ≡ VLL(wL) − VLL(b) ≥
(wL − b)(εH − εL)p
(εLp − b)ρ
≡ ψ(wL) . (24)









φ + δ + λ(1 − FL(x))
=
2(εLp − b)1/2
φ + δ + λ
h
(εLp − b)1/2 − (εLp − wL)1/2
i
.
Note that function ψ increases linearly in wL. Since ϕ is strictly increasing and convex and ϕ(b) =
ψ(b) = 0, it follows that condition (24) holds for all wL if and only if ϕ′(b) ≥ ψ′(b). This is equivalent





Substituting out for ϕ′(b) then yields the condition stated in the proposition. This completes the proof
of Proposition 1. 2
Proof of Proposition 2:
The proof of Proposition 1 reveals that the incentive constraint starts to bind at low-wage ﬁrms when
ρ is just below threshold ρ1. Thus we characterize an equilibrium in which the incentive constraint binds
on a fraction γ ≤ 1 of ﬁrms oﬀering wages wH ∈ [b, ˜ wH], and is slack for the remaining fraction 1−γ of
ﬁrms oﬀering wH ∈ [ ˜ wH,wH], where γ is an equilibrium object determined below. The associated wage
oﬀers for low-ability workers are described by a function wL = ˆ w(wH). When the incentive constraint
binds, it follows that function ˆ w obeys diﬀerential equation (18); the proof of this assertion is exactly
as in Section 3.2 and follows from diﬀerentiation of (2) and (10). We denote by ˆ wIC the unique solution
of this diﬀerential equation with initial condition ˆ wIC(b) = b. Because the RHS of (18) is strictly
decreasing in wH, ˆ wIC is a strictly concave function.
With q(wH) ≡ φ + δ + λ(1 − FH(wH)), ﬁrms facing binding incentive constraints make constant
proﬁt if
ΩIC(wH) = λ(φ + δ)
q(wH)2
h
˜ εp − αHwH − αL ˆ wIC(wH)
i
= λ(φ + δ)(˜ εp − b)
q(b)2 . (25)
31Diﬀerentiation of this equation yields a diﬀerential equation for the wage oﬀer distribution FH:
F′
H(wH) =
(φ + δ + λ)2
h
αLq(wH) + αH(q(wH) + ρ)
i
2λq(wH)(q(wH) + ρ)(˜ εp − b) . (26)
Let FH be the solution of this diﬀerential equation with FH(b) = 0, and deﬁne ˜ wH(γ) by FH( ˜ wH) = γ.
Further, deﬁne ˜ wL(γ) = ˆ wIC( ˜ wH(γ)).
For the remaining fraction of ﬁrms, the incentive constraint is slack (which will be veriﬁed below).
These ﬁrms oﬀer wages wH ≥ ˜ wH to maximize Ωi as deﬁned in (4). It follows from the constant-proﬁt




φ + δ + λ − (φ + δ + λ(1 − γ))
h
εip − wi
εip − ˜ wi
i1/2o
, for wi ≥ ˜ wi ,
for i = H,L. This deﬁnes wi from Fi(wi) = 1 and it also implies that
wL = ˆ wS(wH) ≡ εLp + εLp − ˜ wL
εHp − ˜ wH
(wH − εHp) , wH ∈ [ ˜ wH,wH] . (27)
This shows that ˆ w is deﬁned by the strictly concave function ˆ w(wH) = ˆ wIC(wH) for wH ∈ [b, ˜ wH], and
by the linear function ˆ w(wH) = ˆ wS(wH) on wH ∈ [˜ wH,wH]. Evidently, ˆ w is continuous and strictly
increasing. Because ˆ wIC describes binding incentive constraints, the incentive constraint is slack at all
wages wH > ˜ wH if and only if ˆ wIC(wH) < ˆ wS(wH) for wH > ˜ wH. Because ˆ wIC is strictly concave and
ˆ wS is linear, this is the case iﬀ
ˆ wIC′
( ˜ wH) ≤ ˆ wS′
( ˜ wH)
holds. (18) and (27) imply that this is true iﬀ
εLp − ˜ wL
εHp − ˜ wH
≥ q( ˜ wH)
q( ˜ wH) + ρ . (28)
This condition is necessary for an equilibrium with γ < 1. On the other hand, a binding incentive
constraint implies that the ﬁrm oﬀering ˜ wH (or any wage below) does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to decrease
wH while keeping wL = ˆ w( ˜ wH) ﬁxed. This is true if ΩH, as deﬁned in (4), has a non-negative lower
derivative at wH = ˜ wH, which is true iﬀ
q( ˜ wH) ≤ (εHp − ˜ wH)(φ + δ + λ)2(q( ˜ wH) + αHρ)
(˜ εp − b)(q( ˜ wH) + ρ) .
Using the constant-proﬁt condition (˜ εp−b)/(φ+δ+λ)2 = (˜ εp−αH ˜ wH −αL ˜ wL)/q( ˜ wH)2, this condition
is equivalent to
εLp − ˜ wL
εHp − ˜ wH
≤ q( ˜ wH)
q( ˜ wH) + ρ . (29)
These considerations show that in any equilibrium with γ < 1, (28) and (29) must hold with equality,
whereas an equilibrium with γ = 1 (all ﬁrms face binding incentive constraints) must satisfy the weak
inequality (29). At γ = 1, ˜ wL = wL and ˜ wH = wH, and it follows that (29) coincides with (9). This
32condition, therefore, implicitly pins down threshold parameter ρ2. For any ρ ∈ (ρ2,ρ1), the binding
condition (29) then deﬁnes the equilibrium value of γ ∈ (0,1). This equilibrium exists because the RHS
in (29) is larger than the LHS at γ = 0 (which follows from ρ < ρ1) and since the RHS is smaller than
the LHS at γ = 1 (which follows from ρ > ρ2). Since all functions are continuous in γ, existence follows.
To obtain a closed-form expression for this condition, calculate ˜ wL(γ) using (18) and (26):











= b + 2(˜ εp − b)





= b + 2(˜ εp − b)




φ + δ + λ + αHρ
φ + δ + λ(1 − γ) + αHρ
i









e εp − αL ˜ wL(γ) −
(φ + δ + λ(1 − γ))2
(φ + δ + λ)2 (e εp − b)
￿
.
For γ = 1, ˜ wL(1) = wL and ˜ wH(1) = wH coincide with (7) and (8). This completes the proof of
Proposition 2. 2
Proof of Proposition 3:
Suppose that ρ ≤ ρ2 and consider a ﬁrm which oﬀers wH to high-ability workers. Such a ﬁrm makes
the same proﬁt on high-ability workers, irrespective of its wage oﬀer to low-ability workers. This is
because high-ability workers’ acceptance and quit rates are independent of the wage oﬀer wL ≤ wH.
Hence, the decision of what wage to oﬀer to low-ability workers only depends on a ﬁrm’s proﬁt on
low-ability workers. Let b wIC denote the incentive-compatibility relation between wH and wL satisfying
(10). Also denote by q(wH) ≡ φ + δ + λ(1 − FH(wH)) the separation rate of a ﬁrm oﬀering wH.
If the ﬁrm decides to oﬀer wL = ˆ wIC(wH) to these workers (i.e. a separating contract), its proﬁt per
hire is (εLp − ˆ wIC(wH))/q(wH). But if the ﬁrm oﬀers wL = ˆ w(wH) < ˆ wIC(wH) to low-ability workers
(i.e. a pooling contract), all these workers accept wage wH and are laid oﬀ back to unemployment at rate
ρ. The ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt per low-ability hire is then (εLp − wH)/(q(wH) + ρ). Now in both cases,
the hiring rate of low-ability workers is the same: The ﬁrm hires all low-ability workers whose current
lifetime utility is smaller than VLH(wH), because of the binding incentive compatibility constraint, the
worker would also obtain VLL(wL) = VLH(wH) in a separating contract. Thus hiring rates are the
same regardless of the type of contract oﬀered. It follows that oﬀering separating contracts dominates
oﬀering a pooling contract iﬀ






33Rewrite this condition as
Φ(wH) ≡ ρ(εLp − ˆ wIC(wH)) + q(wH)(wH − ˆ wIC(wH)) ≥ 0. (30)
It is easy to see that Φ(b) > 0 and Φ′(w) < 0. Hence, there is a unique threshold wage ˜ wH satisfying
Φ( ˜ wH) ≥ 0 , ˜ wH ≤ wH ,
with complementary slackness. This implies that ﬁrms oﬀer separating contracts when wH ≤ ˜ wH and
they oﬀer pooling contracts when wH > ˜ wH. Φ(b) > 0 directly implies that ˜ wH > b, so that separating
dominates pooling at the lowest-wage ﬁrms. This completes the proof of Proposition 3. 2
Proof of Theorem 1:
From the discussion in the text, the equilibrium fraction of ﬁrms oﬀering separating contracts η > 0
satisﬁes the complementary slackness condition
T(η) ≥ η , η ≤ 1 . (31)
Conversely, any η solving this condition deﬁnes a market equilibrium. Because of limη→0 ˜ wi(η) = b <
εLp for i = L,H, it follows that limη→0 T(η) = ∞. Because T is a continuous function, existence
and uniqueness follows under the provision that T intersects the 45-degree line at most once: then the
complementary-slackness condition (31) must have a unique solution η ∈ (0,1].
To prove that T has at most one ﬁxed point, we claim that T(η) = η implies T′(η) = 0. To show
this property, consider any candidate η = T(η) and diﬀerentiate function T:
T′(η) = − ρ
λ( ˜ wH(η) − ˜ wL(η)) ˜ w′
L(η) − ρ(εLp − ˜ wL(η))
λ( ˜ wH(η) − ˜ wL(η))2
￿
˜ w′
H(η) − ˜ w′
L(η)
￿
= − ρ˜ w′
L(η)
λ( ˜ wH(η) − ˜ wL(η))
(
ˆ w′( ˜ wH(η)) + εLp − ˜ wL(η)
˜ wH(η) − ˜ wL(η)
￿




Here the last line uses that ˜ w′
L = ˆ w′ ˜ w′
H. From (18) follows that
ˆ w′( ˜ wH(η)) = q( ˜ wH(η))
q( ˜ wH(η)) + ρ ,
and T(η) = η implies that
εLp − ˜ wL(η)
˜ wH(η) − ˜ wL(η) = −q(˜ wH(η))
ρ .
Taken together, this implies that the expression in braces is zero, and hence T′(η) = 0. This proves
that equilibrium exists and is unique.
To prove the second claim, note that an equilibrium with η < 1 exists if, and only if, T(1) < 1.
Furthermore, note that ˜ wi(1) = wi, deﬁned in (7) and (8); cf. also the expressions for ˜ wi in Appendix
C. Then, T(1) < 1 gives rise to the equivalent condition
(φ + δ)(wH − wL) < ρ(wL − εLp) . (32)
34Denote the dependence on parameter ρ by wi(ρ), and deﬁne
Ψ(ρ) ≡ (φ + δ)(wH(ρ) − wL(ρ)) − ρ(wL(ρ) − εLp) .
Note that wL(0) = wH(0) = w = e εp − [(φ + δ)/(φ + δ + λ)]2(e εp − b), which is the highest wage oﬀer in
the no-information case. Because of Ψ(0) = 0 the condition for a segmented equilibrium (32) is satisﬁed
for suﬃciently low values of ρ iﬀ Ψ′(0) < 0. Diﬀerentiate Ψ at ρ = 0:







Now diﬀerentiate (7) and (8) at ρ = 0:
w′
L(0) = −2(˜ εp − b)λαH




Substitute this into the above to obtain
Ψ′(0) = εLp − w + 2λ(φ + δ)(˜ εp − b)
(φ + δ + λ)2 .
Then, some simple manipulation shows that Ψ′(0) < 0 is equivalent to the inequality condition stated
in Theorem 1. Therefore, under this condition, there exists a threshold value ρ3 > 0 such that Ψ(ρ) < 0




Fi(wi) = βHFi(wi | pH) + (1 − βH)Fi(wi | pL) (33)
denote the proportion of ﬁrms that oﬀer a wage no greater than wi to workers of ability i, for i = L,H,
with wi and wi denoting the inﬁmum and supremum of the support of Fi. Again we consider a candidate
equilibrium with the rank-preservation property: Wages oﬀered by any ﬁrm satisfy wL = ˆ w(wH) with
an increasing function ˆ w.
Given the speciﬁcation for Fi, the worker’s problem is the same as in the homogeneous case. A ﬁrm
of type k maximizes expected proﬁt Ωk(wH,wL). Let Ωk = maxΩk(wH,wL).
Finally, we use the same equilibrium concept as before, but require that the constant-proﬁt condition
(i) is satisﬁed for each ﬁrm type k; i.e.
Ωk(wH,wL) = Ωk and FL(wL|pk) = FH(wH|pk) for all wH ∈ suppFH(.|pk) and wL = ˆ w(wH) .
Before we characterize the relevant sorting equilibria, we prove a few results on the optimal wage
policies of heterogeneous ﬁrms. Note that optimal worker behavior is exactly the same as in the model
35with homogeneous ﬁrms. Particularly, workers select into wage contracts according to the same incentive
constraint (3) as before. We focus on the case where the ﬁrms’ learning rate is suﬃciently low so that
incentive constraints are binding for all ﬁrms.
Consider any oﬀer distribution FH with support [wH,wH] such that wH ≥ b and wH < ∞ and
recall that q(wH) = φ + δ + λ(1 − FH(wH)). It is convenient to deﬁne the following constants,






for k = L,H.
Lemma a.1:
(i) Given Φk < 0, there exist threshold wages b wk > 0, k = H,L, such that a ﬁrm of type k oﬀering
wH to high-ability workers prefers to oﬀer separating contracts if wH < b wk and prefers to oﬀer pooling
contracts if wH > b wk.
(ii) Given such thresholds exist, then b wH > b wL. That is, if a low-productivity ﬁrm oﬀering wH to
high-ability workers prefers to oﬀer separating contracts, a high-productivity ﬁrm would strictly prefer
to oﬀer separating contracts when it oﬀers wH to high-ability workers.
(iii) If two pooling ﬁrms of type k = H,L oﬀer wages wHk to high-ability workers, it must be that
wHH > wHL.
(iv) If two separating ﬁrms of type k = H,L oﬀer wages wHk to high-ability workers, it must be that
wHH > wHL.
Proof: To prove the ﬁrst two parts, consider a ﬁrm of type k oﬀering w to high-ability workers. This
ﬁrm then makes the same expected proﬁt from high-ability workers, irrespective of its contract choice
(cf. the proﬁt expressions (16) and (17)). To determine whether oﬀering separating contracts is better
than oﬀering pooling contracts, we need to compare the corresponding proﬁts from hiring of low-ability
workers. If the ﬁrm oﬀers separating contracts, its proﬁt from low-ability workers is
h(w)
εLpk − b w(w)
q(w)
, (34)
where h(w) is the hiring rate of low-ability workers (see Appendix C), 1/q(w) is expected job duration,
and ˆ w(w) is the separating wage, implicitly deﬁned from (10). If the ﬁrm oﬀers pooling contracts, its





where h(w) is the same hiring rate as in (34).
The ﬁrm decides to oﬀer separating contracts if (34) is larger than (35), i.e.
(q(w) + ρ)(εLpk − ˆ w(w)) ≥ q(w)(εLpk − w) .
36Deﬁne
Φk(w) ≡ ρεLpk − (q(w) + ρ) ˆ w(w) + q(w)w
and note that the above inequality corresponds to Φk(w) ≥ 0. It is easy to verify that Φk(b) > 0
and that Φ′
k(w) = −λF′
H(w)[w − ˆ w(w)] < 0 for all w ∈ [wH,wH] and Φ′
k(w) = 0 for w > w. Given
Φk = Φk(wH) < 0, continuity implies that there exists a unique threshold wage b wk > b such that
Φ(b wk) = 0. In this case, the ﬁrm prefers to oﬀer separating contracts if w < ˆ wk and it prefers to oﬀer
pooling contracts if w > ˆ wk. Otherwise all ﬁrms oﬀer separating contracts. This completes the proof
of part (i).
Part (ii) follows directly because Φ is strictly increasing in pk.
To prove part (iii), consider a low- and high-productivity ﬁrm oﬀering a pooling contract with wages
wHL and wHH, respectively. The aim is to show that wHH ≥ wHL in equilibrium. Consider equation
(17), which describes the proﬁts of a ﬁrm oﬀering a pooling contract. Let LP
H(wH) = λ(φ+δ)αH/q(wH)2
and LP
L(wH) = λ(φ+δ+φ)αL/(q(wH)+ρ)2 and note that both expressions are increasing in wH. Using
a similar argument as in Burdett and Mortensen (1998), it holds that in equilibrium
LP
L(wHH)(εLpH − wHH) + LP
H(wHH)(εHpH − wHH)
≥ LP
L(wHL)(εLpH − wHL) + LP
H(wHL)(εHpH − wHL)
> LP
L(wHL)(εLpL − wHL) + LP
H(wHL)(εHpL − wHL)
≥ LP
L(wHH)(εLpL − wHH) + LP





H(wHL)εH. Since this inequality holds for
any equilibrium oﬀers wHL and wHH, it follows from the monotonicity of LP
k that wHH ≥ wHL. This
completes the proof of part (iii).
To prove (iv), consider a low-productivity ﬁrm oﬀering wHL and wLL = b w(wHL) and a high-
productivity ﬁrm oﬀering wHH and wLH = b w(wHH). Recall that b w is increasing in wH. Now consider
equation (16), which describes the proﬁts of ﬁrms oﬀering separating contracts. Let LS
H(wH) = λ(φ +
δ)αH/q(wH)2 and LS
L(wH) = λθ(η)αL/q(wH)2 and note that both expressions are increasing in wH. Us-





which implies wHH ≥ wHL. This completes the proof of Lemma a.1. 2
B.1 Sorting Equilibrium
The previous Lemma shows that in any market equilibrium: (i) conditional on productivity, ﬁrms
oﬀering separating contracts pay lower wages than ﬁrms oﬀering pooling contracts, and (ii), high-
productivity ﬁrms pay higher wages than low-productivity ﬁrms. In what follows we focus on a candidate
equilibrium in which a fraction η ≤ 1 of ﬁrms oﬀer separating contracts. As before ﬁrms oﬀering
separating contracts post wages wH ∈ [b, e wH] and wL = b w(wH) ≤ wH with e wL = b w(e wH) satisfying
37(10). The remaining fraction 1−η of ﬁrms oﬀers wH > e wH to high-ability workers and wL = ˆ w(wH) to
low-ability workers, satisfying (11). Note that as in the homogeneous case, the arguments of Burdett
and Mortensen (1998) imply that the wage oﬀer distributions, FH(. | pk) for k = L,H, are continuous
and exhibit connected supports.
Given Lemma a.1, there are two natural equilibrium candidates. First, if η < βL, low-productivity
ﬁrms oﬀer both separating and pooling contracts and all high-productivity ﬁrms oﬀer pooling contracts;
in this equilibrium the threshold wages of Lemma a.1 satisfy ˆ wk < e wH for k = L,H. Second, if η > β,
all low-productivity ﬁrms oﬀer separating contracts and high-productivity ﬁrms oﬀer separating and
pooling contracts; here we have ˆ wk > e wH, k = L,H.21 We now turn to characterize these two types of
equilibria.
Case I: η < βL
In this case, some low-productivity ﬁrms oﬀer separating contracts and some low-productivity ﬁrms
and all high-productivity ﬁrms oﬀer pooling contracts. It is immediate that the arguments presented
for the homogeneous case also apply here and imply that for a given η the wages oﬀered to low-
ability workers by separating ﬁrms, wL = b w(wH), are described by (18) subject to the initial condition
b w(b) = b. Further, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 (with p = pL) describe the oﬀer distribution, FH, for wages
wH ∈ [b,wHL] such that e wH(η) solves FH(e wH) = η using Lemma 1 and wHL(η) solves FH(wHL) = βL
using Lemma 2. It then follows from Lemma a.1 and (33) that FH(wH | pL) = FH(wH)/βL for all
wH ∈ [b,wHL].
To obtain the oﬀer distribution for wages wH ∈ [wHH,wHH] ﬁrst note that optimality implies
wHH(η) = wHL(η). Further, since equilibrium requires that ΩP(wHH,wLH) = ΩP(wH,wL) for all
wH ∈ [wHH,wHH], wL = ˆ w(wH), distribution FH is described by the diﬀerential equation in Lemma 2
with p = pH subject to the initial condition FH(wHH) = βL and wHH(η) solves FH(wHH) = 1. In this
case, Lemma a.1 and (33) imply FH(wH | pH) = [FH(wH) − βL]/[1 − βL] for wH ∈ [wHH,wHH].
The last step to characterize the equilibrium is to solve for η. This can be done using the arguments
of the homogeneous case by obtaining the ﬁxed point of T in (19) with p = pL. Note, however, that we
must apply the restriction η ∈ (0,βL).
Case II: η > βL
Now consider the case in which all low-productivity ﬁrms and some high-productivity ﬁrms oﬀer
separating contracts, while some high-productivity ﬁrms oﬀer pooling contracts. Once again, the argu-
ments presented in the homogeneous can be applied here and imply that for a given η the wages oﬀered
to low-ability workers wL = b w(wH) are described by (18) subject to the initial condition b w(b) = b.
Further, the oﬀer distribution, FH, for wages wH ∈ [b,wHL] solves the diﬀerential equation in Lemma
21There is actually a third equilibrium candidate where both types of ﬁrms oﬀer both types of contract ( ˆ wL < e wH < ˆ wH).
However, Lemma a.1 part (ii) rules out equilibria in which all low-productivity ﬁrms oﬀer separating contracts and all
high-productivity ﬁrms oﬀer pooling contracts.
381with p = pL subject to the initial condition FH(b) = 0 and wHL solves FH(wHL) = βL. As before we
have that FH(wH | pL) = FH(wH)/βL for all wH ∈ [b,wHL].
Since optimality implies wHH(η) = wHL(η), (18) describes wL = b w(wH) for those ﬁrms with high
productivity oﬀering separating contracts. The diﬀerential equation in Lemma 1 (with p = pH) describes
the corresponding oﬀer distribution, FH(.), for wages wH ∈ [wHH, e wH(η)] subject to the initial condition
FH(wHH) = βL and e wH(η) solves FH(e wH) = η. Lemma 2 with p = pH describes the oﬀer distribution for
wages wH ∈ (e wH(η),wHH], where wHH solves FH(wHH) = 1 and FH(wH | pH) = [FH(wH)−βL]/[1−βL]
for wH ∈ [wHH,wHH].
Finally, η is determined by the ﬁxed point of T as described in (19) with p = pH, given the restriction
that η ∈ (βL,1].
C Omitted Derivations
Derivation of the steady-state unemployment rates and the earnings distribution of workers:
Consider unemployment of high-ability workers, uH. The inﬂow into this category is (φ+δ)(αH−uH),
while the outﬂow is given by λuH. Steady-state turnover then yields the expression in the main text.
Similarly consider the proportion of high-ability workers earning a wage no greater than wH, GH(wH).
The inﬂow into this category is given by λFH(wH)uH, while the outﬂow is given by q(wH)GH(wH)(αH−
uH). Steady-state turnover then implies (13).
Now consider unemployment of low-ability workers. The inﬂow into this category is given [φ + δ +
ρ(1 − GL(e wL))](αL − uL), while the outﬂow is given by λuL. Steady-state turnover yields
uL =
[φ + δ + ρ(1 − GL(e wL))]αL
φ + δ + λ + ρ(1 − GL(e wL))
.
Next consider those low-ability workers earning wages no greater than wL ∈ [b, e wL]. The inﬂow into
this category is given by λFH(b w−1(wL))uL. The outﬂow is given by [φ+δ+λ(1−FH(b w−1(wL)))]GL(wL)(αL−
uL). Steady-state turnover and FH(e wH) = η then imply
GL(wL) =
λFH(b w−1(wL))uL
[φ + δ + λ(1 − FH(b w−1(wL)))](αL − uL)
.
Evaluating GL(wL) at wL = e wL and solving the above two equations gives the corresponding measures
described in the main text.
Finally consider the proportion of low-ability workers employed in ﬁrms oﬀering pooling contracts
at wages w′
H ∈ [e wH,wH]. Since any low-ability worker will misreport his type when oﬀered such a
wage, the ﬂow of workers into this category is given by λ[uL + GL(e wL)(αL − uL)][FH(wH) − FH(e wH)].
The worker ﬂow out of this category is [φ + δ + ρ + λ(1 − FH(wH))][GL(wH) − GL(e wH)](αL − uL).
39Noting that GL(e wL) = GL(e wH) and using the above expressions imply that the steady-state proportion
of low-ability workers earning a wage no greater than wH ∈ [e wH,wH] is given by (15).
Derivation of the steady-state proﬁts for ﬁrms oﬀering separating and pooling contracts:
First consider a ﬁrm that oﬀers wH ≤ e wH to high-ability workers and wL = b w(wH) ≤ e wL to
low-ability workers. This ﬁrm’s steady-state proﬁt is
ΩS(wH,wL) = hL(wL)JL(wL) + hH(wH)JH(wH) ,
where hi are the hiring ﬂows and Ji are proﬁt values per hire of type i = H,L. Noting that hi(wi) =








where θ(η) is deﬁned in the main text. Further, since all workers quit to a ﬁrm oﬀering higher wages,








Substituting out the above expressions in ΩS(wH,wL) and some algebra establishes (16) in the text.
Next consider a ﬁrm that oﬀers wH > e wH to high-ability workers and wL = b w(wH) to low-ability
workers, satisfying (11). Since low-ability workers will misreport their type when meeting this ﬁrm, its
steady-state proﬁt is
ΩP(wH,wL) = [hL(wH) + hL(wH)]J(wH) .
Noting that posting wH yields a hiring rate hi(wH) = λui + λGi(wH)(αi − ui) for i = L,H and using
(12), (13) and (15), we have that
hL(wH) =






Further, the expected proﬁt per new hire by oﬀering wH is given by
J(wH) =
[e αH(wH)εH + e αL(wH)εL]p − wH + ρ[e αH(wH)JH(wH)]
ρ + q(wH)
,
where e αi(wH) = hi(wH)/[hL(wH)+hH(wH)] denotes the proportion of type i = L,H workers the ﬁrm
attracts by posting wH; and JH(wH) denotes the expected value to the ﬁrm of employing a worker





Substituting out these expressions in ΩP(wH,wL) and some algebra establishes (17) in the text.
40Derivation of e wL(η) and e wH(η):
First consider the diﬀerential equation (18) describing wL subject to the initial condition b w(b) = b,
and note that this equation applies for values of wH ∈ [b, e wH]. Integration implies
e wL(η) = b +
Z e wH(η)
b
φ + δ + λ(1 − FH(wH))
φ + δ + ρ + λ(1 − FH(wH))
dwH.
Consider the following change of variable: q = φ+δ+λ(1−FH(wH)) such that dq = −λF′
H(wH)dwH.
Using the expression for F′
H(wH) described in Lemma 1 we have that
e wL(η) = b +
2[(φ + δ)αH(εHp − b) + θ(η)αL(εLp − b)]




(φ + δ)αHρ + [(φ + δ)αH + θ(η)αL]q
dq.
Integration then yields
e wL(η) = b +
2[(φ + δ)αH(εHp − b) + θ(η)αL(εLp − b)]
(φ + δ + λ)2[(φ + δ)αH + θ(η)αL]3 ×
h
[(φ + δ)αHρ]2 log
￿
(φ + δ)αHρ + ((φ + δ)αH + θ(η)αL)(φ + δ + λ)
(φ + δ)αHρ + ((φ + δ)αH + θ(η)αL)(φ + δ + λ(1 − η))
￿
+λη[(φ + δ)αH + θ(η)αL]2
￿








(φ + δ)αH + θ(η)αL
￿i
.
The closed-form expression for ˜ wH(η) is obtained using the constant-proﬁt condition ΩS( ˜ wH, ˜ wL) =
ΩS(b,b). This yields
e wH(η) = εHp +




φ + δ + λ(1 − η)
φ + δ + λ
￿2 ￿





where e wL(η) is given above. Further, note that when η = 1, these expression collapse to the ones in (7)
and (8).
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